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ABSTRACT
In 2012, the WHO launched its Global Surveillance and 
Monitoring System (GSMS) for substandard and falsified 
medicines, with the aim of improving the quality of 
reporting and using the data to inform post- market 
surveillance and build regulatory capacity. However, from 
a regulatory governance perspective, its effectiveness 
depends on the willingness and ability of actors ‘on 
the ground’ to identify, report and investigate possible 
infringements and to enforce penalties. This paper 
presents findings from 27 interviews with representatives 
of agencies charged with regulating pharmaceutical 
markets and 4 interviews with pharmaceutical industry 
representatives in Tanzania. Their experiences provide 
important insights into how the theorised mechanism 
between reporting and a reduction in undesirable 
behaviours can play out in a low- income context, revealing 
hidden assumptions about regulator behaviour and 
motivations. A combination of chronic under- resourcing, 
information gaps and enforcement challenges conspires 
to limit the efforts of local regulators to achieve the GSMS 
goals, shedding new light on the relationship between 
apparent ‘misconduct’ and structural constraints.
INTRODUCTION
Substandard and falsified (SF) medicines 
constitute a major public health threat, 
particularly in low- income and middle- income 
countries (LMICs), where regulatory capacity 
may be relatively weak, disease burdens high 
and where reliance on imported medicines 
and supplies results in complex and opaque 
supply chains.1 2 The WHO3 recently esti-
mated over 10% of pharmaceutical products 
globally are of poor quality, whether through 
deliberate fraud, poor manufacturing prac-
tice or deterioration. Poor- quality antibiotics 
and antimalarials are believed to result in 
more than 200 000 child deaths per year1 3–5 
and contribute significantly to antimicrobial 
resistance.6 7
As early as 1999, the WHO outlined factors 
facilitating the manufacture and trade in 
poor- quality medicines and recommended 
remedial measures to address access, gover-
nance and technical capacity.8 At the heart 
of the current WHO strategy is the Global 
Surveillance and Monitoring System (GSMS). 
The GSMS, established in 2012, aims to ‘work 
with WHO Member States to improve the 
quality of reporting of SF medical products, 
and, importantly, to ensure the data collected 
are analysed and used to influence policy, 
procedure and processes to protect public 
health, at the national, regional and the 
global level’.5 The system receives, collates 
and responds to reports from focal points 
in national medicine regulatory author-
ities, inspectorates, enforcement units, 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► The WHO’s Global Surveillance and Monitoring 
System (GSMS) aims to improve the quality of re-
porting of substandard and falsified (SF) medicines, 
inform post- market surveillance and build regulatory 
capacity.
 ► Regulatory effectiveness depends on the willingness 
and ability of actors ‘on the ground’ to identify, re-
port and investigate infringements and to enforce 
penalties.
What are the new findings?
 ► ‘On the ground’ regulators often lack resources to 
fulfil their roles properly.
 ► Regulators’ ability and willingness to investigate 
and sanction allegations is inhibited by difficulties in 
cooperating with other agencies in order to collect 
evidence.
 ► Regulatory violations are often ignored and, even if 
exposed, are unlikely to be sanctioned.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► The GSMS mechanism is severely inhibited by ca-
pacity constraints, economic and social barriers to 
reporting and poor diagnostic tools.
 ► Our findings cast doubt on the extent to which weak 
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pharmacovigilance centres and quality control labora-
tories. The short- term goal is to facilitate emergency 
responses to SF medicines in circulation, with a longer- 
term aim of using the data to inform post- market surveil-
lance and build regulatory capacity. This article focuses 
on these longer- term aims, using a regulatory governance 
theoretical framework and providing empirical evidence 
from the ‘on- the- ground’ experiences of regulators in a 
lower/middle- income setting, Tanzania.
The GSMS is a form of regulatory governance 
concerned with standard- setting and behaviour modifi-
cation.9–11 Through gathering and collating information, 
it aims to reduce the harm caused by poor- quality medi-
cines through changing the behaviour of actors involved 
in the manufacture, trade and oversight of pharmaceu-
ticals. Evidence suggests that monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms can improve governance and provision 
of public services12 including in healthcare systems in 
LMICs.13 14 They are used in various settings with the 
aim of reducing misconduct, crime and corruption, 
either by activating improved social accountability and 
reducing asymmetric information in ‘principal- agent’ 
situations15 16 or by motivating governments and regula-
tors to improve compliance, in order to boost their repu-
tation vis- a- vis peers.17 18 In the current context, the aim 
of reporting mechanisms is twofold: to detect behaviours 
responsible for the circulation of SF medicines and to 
deter them in future; sometimes called ‘direct’ and ‘indi-
rect’ effects.19 20 However, the pathway from collecting 
data to changing behaviours is not straightforward and 
depends on actors being willing and able to comply with 
rules through several stages.
In the case of the GSMS, the necessary chain of events 
is as follows. First, SF medicines entering the market must 
be identified, either by regulators or by others reporting 
suspicions to regulators. Second, regulators must act on 
the information: undertaking investigations, imposing 
sanctions on wrongdoers and fixing any regulatory weak-
ness. This leads to the third step, whereby behaviours 
change, limiting the opportunities for poor- quality 
medicines to penetrate and circulate in the market (see 
figure 1).
If it works effectively, such a system could reduce the 
overall prevalence of SF medicines in circulation through 
multiple mechanisms: ensuring poor- quality products on 
the market are detected and removed; improving regula-
tion to prevent SF medicines from reaching the market 
in the first place; and altering the cost- benefit calculus 
of undertaking and/or reporting dubious practices (if 
perceptions change about the likelihood of detection 
and effective sanction). However, the functioning of the 
GSMS and its capacity to achieve its aims depends on the 
very earliest stages of the process: the identification and 
reporting of suspect products. It therefore relies heavily 
on national regulators having good access to information 
and, crucially, being willing to report it. National regulators 
depend largely on receiving reports from multiple local 
actors, including regional and district representatives of 
Food and Drugs Authorities, Pharmacy Councils, Stan-
dards Authorities and others.
The purpose of this study is to understand how regula-
tors working ‘on the ground’ in Tanzania (a low- income 
country with relatively well- functioning regulatory author-
ities21) manage the various steps of the monitoring and 
reporting system set out above. We present data, from 
interviews with 27 national- level and local- level regu-
lators and 4 interviews with industry representatives of 
local pharmaceutical companies, that show how capacity 
constraints, institutional arrangements, economic incen-
tives and ethical dilemmas intersect in the ‘real world’, 
producing serious barriers to movement through this 
chain of action. We argue that these obstacles are likely 
to prevail in many LMIC contexts, creating significant 
challenges for effective quality assurance.
Tanzanian context
Pharmaceutical medicines in Tanzania can legally be 
sold in licensed pharmacies and in Accredited Drug 
Dispensing Outlets (ADDOs), the latter coming from 
a donor- supported initiative launched in 2003 by the 
(then) Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA) to 
improve access to essential medicines for under- served 
rural populations.22 Pharmacies can sell all three cate-
gories of retailed medicines (prescription only, phar-
macy only and general sales list), while ADDOs are only 
permitted to retail those on the general sales list. In May 
2020 there were 1775 registered pharmacies in Tanzania 
(https//www. pc. go. tz/ premises/ all. php). In 2019, there 
were 14 036 accredited ADDOs in Tanzania (Tanzania 
Pharmacy Council, 2020) known in Swahili as ‘Maduka 
ya dawa muhimu’ (literally, essential medicines shop). In 
addition, a proportion of pharmaceutical medicines are 
sold illegally from unregulated outlets including grocery 
and other unlicensed shops, market stalls and itinerant 
peddlers selling from car boots or door- to- door.
In Tanzania, the task of regulating pharmaceutical 
licencing and quality is distributed across multiple agen-
cies. During our fieldwork, the TFDA was the federal 
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agency with primary responsibility for ensuring the 
quality, safety and efficacy of medicines, medical devices 
and diagnostics, overseeing production, import, distribu-
tion and sales (these responsibilities were re- designated 
in 2019 to the newly formed Tanzania Medicines and 
Medical Devices Authority, TMDA). Complementing 
the work of the TFDA/TMDA is the Pharmacy Council 
of Tanzania, which oversees, regulates and controls 
professional conduct in retail pharmacies. Other federal 
agencies implicated in the regulation and governance 
of pharmaceuticals in Tanzania include (inter alia) the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority, Fair Competition Commis-
sion, Tanzania Police Force, Environmental Protection 
Agencies and Trading Officers.
The TFDA/TMDA is considered to be one of the 
most effective medicine regulatory authorities in sub- 
Saharan Africa, and Tanzania is the first African state to 
be recognised by the WHO as having achieved a well- 
functioning, regulatory system for medical products.23 
Nonetheless, regulatory authorities in Tanzania share 
some of the constraints experienced in other LMICs, 
including chronic under- resourcing, weak infrastructures 
and excessive workloads resulting from a high turnover in 
products.21 As we discuss later, these have serious impli-
cations for the efficacy and sustainability of processes to 
protect the quality of medicines reaching consumers.
METHODS
This study adopted a qualitative, interpretative method-
ology, based on semi- structured interviews designed to 
capture participants’ experiences and interpretations on 
their own terms, while ensuring that key pre- specified 
themes were covered systematically. Over two periods of 
fieldwork in Tanzania (June 2016 and January 2017), the 
authors (academic social scientists based in Tanzania and 
the UK) conducted 27 interviews with regulators repre-
senting 6 national level and 10 regional and district level 
authorities regulating medicines and medical products, 
and licensing pharmacies and ADDOs. Four additional 
interviews were conducted with representatives of the 
local pharmaceutical industry in Tanzania. Interviews 
were conducted in two main locations: Dar- es- Salaam 
(the main commercial and import hub of Tanzania) 
and Mwanza Region (situated in northwest Tanzania, on 
the southern shores of Lake Victoria). Within Mwanza 
Region, we worked principally in the regional capital, 
Mwanza City, and the smaller settlements of Magu and 
Misungwi districts.
The 27 regulators were selected purposively to achieve a 
maximum variation sample. Selection was based on their 
positions within key agencies responsible for pharmaceu-
tical regulation at national and regional/district levels, 
with data collection continuing to the point of theoret-
ical saturation. Interview topics included questions about 
agencies’ regulatory responsibilities, individual roles 
and the daily challenges individuals faced in fulfilling 
their statutory duties. The four pharmaceutical industry 
representatives were selected purposively for their expert 
local knowledge and interviews focused on gaining an 
overview of the industry, its evolution and future develop-
ment. Interviewers took hand- written notes rather than 
audio recordings, because of the potential sensitivity 
of the material. Notes were subsequently typed up and 
analysed following the principles of Grounded Theory, 
whereby theoretical insight emerges from data through 
an iterative process of close- reading, coding and testing 
of nascent hypotheses through subsequent fieldwork.24 25 
In the first cycle, data were coded descriptively according 
to the stage of the regulatory process. In the second cycle, 
codes were analysed thematically to identify motivations 
for, and obstacles to, reporting, investigating and so on. 
The quotations throughout this paper are illustrative of 
experiences reported by the wider sample.
Because of the sensitive nature of some information 
presented, we have taken great care to protect inter-
viewees’ anonymity, by not giving any names or other 
potentially identifying information, instead identifying 
them with more general categories (eg, national- level 
regulator). In this study we have followed Standards for 
Reporting Qualitative Research reporting guidelines.25
Patient and public involvement statement
The study was designed in collaboration with attendees 
at a Stakeholder meeting for national- level regulators 
in Dar- es- Salaam in May 2016. The stakeholder group 
provided input into the research design, the research 
instruments and the sampling methods.
RESULTS
Perceptions of the SF medicine problem
An important precursor to engagement with reporting/
monitoring systems like GSMS is recognition of the 
‘problem’. Our fieldwork in Tanzania suggested there was 
little shared understanding among regulators about the 
scale, nature and source of SF medicines in the country.
In relation to scale and severity, some interviewees 
reported the prevalence of SF medicines to be high, repre-
senting a major and systemic threat to public health 
(‘Trust me’, said one local regulator in Mwanza City, ‘It is 
a very big problem’), while others downplayed the risks. 
For some, the major threat came from large- scale opera-
tions manufacturing and/or importing substantial quan-
tities of illegal products, while others suggested that most 
poor- quality products came from small- scale, ‘lower tech’ 
outfits; for example, generic medicines being repack-
aged at a very local level. ‘They are looking for cheap 
money by trying to get more money for generic drugs. 
This is a very small- scale practice done by people in the 
streets who might just make ten labels and that is it. Not 
done by professionals’, said one local regulator. Another 
gave us this example:
In Tanzania, we have captured some citizens filling amoxi-
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expiry dates. These are just cheap labelling machines so 
easy and cheap to do—small scale operations.
There was also variation in perceptions about the 
precise nature of the problem, echoing debates in the 
academic literature on SF medicines (eg, Hamilton et 
al26) and also in Kingori and Gerrets’ (p380) discussion 
of pseudo global heath: ‘the indeterminate, blurry and 
messy spectrum that exists between binary oppositions 
such as fake/real or authentic/inauthentic’.27 The two 
interview excerpts above describe deliberate falsification 
but with different possible effects on the user. In the first 
case (passing off a generic product as a more expensive 
branded version to increase profits) the end result may 
still be of high quality, although of uncertain and unver-
ifiable source. In the second case (capsules filled with 
flour rather than antibiotic), the result is clearly unlikely 
to have any therapeutic effect beyond a placebo. Like-
wise, fraudulent manipulation of expiry dates is likely to 
impact negatively on the quality of the product, but the 
severity will depend on the stability of the molecules and 
the conditions of storage.
Other interviewees stated that sub- standard produc-
tion (resulting in products that have been authorised by 
national regulatory authorities but are nonetheless non- 
compliant with quality standards) or post- manufacture 
deterioration (eg, resulting from inadequate transport 
or storage facilities) were bigger threats than delib-
erate falsification (fraudulent misrepresentation of a 
drug’s identity, composition or source). However, as one 
national- level regulator noted, there can be a fine line 
between deliberate malpractice and strategic business 
decisions to under- invest in quality assurance. Regula-
tors were also concerned about medicines registered 
in a neighbouring country but not licenced for sale in 
Tanzania; here, the issue was not necessarily about quality 
per se, but rather the integrity and governance of Tanza-
nia’s pharmaceutical markets.
Finally, opinions differed as to the origin of SF medi-
cines and point of penetration into Tanzanian supply 
chains. Some, like this national government represen-
tative, raised doubts about quality control in domestic 
production:
Many of them [local manufacturers] don’t have good qual-
ity control. For example, the issue of not putting the right 
number of tablets in the bottle. This indicates poor man-
ufacturing practice and there may be other quality issues 
too.
However, most blamed the large number of foreign 
imports, especially those coming from India, China and 
Nigeria. There was general consensus that Tanzania’s 
‘porous borders’ made it particularly vulnerable:
It is a global issue—you cannot say you are safe. We have 
porous borders with neighbouring countries […]. In Tan-
zania we have good regulation, but we have a very long 
coastline and many unofficial ports where goods can en-
ter. Or they may come across land borders from DRC, 
Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi … You cannot build a 
wall! (National- level regulator)
In Mwanza City, reported traffic across Lake Victoria 
made it particularly difficult to confirm the product’s 
country of origin:
They come to Tanzania from other countries around the 
Lake: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC. But you 
can’t actually tell where they are manufactured. They 
might just pass through these countries. (Local regulator, 
Mwanza City)
Questions about the relative importance of formal and 
informal entry points also elicited mixed opinions. Several 
interviewees in Dar- es- Salaam suggested that regulation 
at official ports of entry was so weak that it made no sense 
to avoid them. Instead of making the effort to smuggle 
SF medicines through a remote or ‘informal’ channel, 
said one, one could go straight through the main Dar- 
es- Salaam ports, with very little chance of being checked.
Against this background of uncertainty and variation 
in perception of the nature, scale and severity of the SF 
‘problem’, we consider in turn each of the three stages 
needed for an effective monitoring and reporting system 
to improve pharmaceutical governance (outlined in the 
Introduction section), noting constraints experienced by 
actors at each point.
Identifying and reporting suspect products
The first requirement of a well- functioning monitoring 
and reporting system is people’s ability and willingness 
to identify and report suspect products. Our interviewees 
saw this unequivocally to be a vital public health respon-
sibility. Many applauded efforts of organisations like the 
TF(M)DA, telling us: ‘the TFDA is one of the best in 
Africa. They are thoroughly examining documents, so I 
am very confident that whatever comes into the country is 
good’ (National- level industry representative). However, 
those working ‘on the ground’ highlighted various factors 
that conspired to frustrate their efforts.
First, in common with many LMICs, regulatory agen-
cies in Tanzania (especially at local level) are often under- 
resourced; their capacity outstripped by the enormity of 
the task. During our fieldwork, the TFDA Zonal Office 
in Mwanza, responsible for post- market surveillance in 
the Lake Zone (an area of 120 000 km2, half the size of 
the UK, with a population of over 12 million), had just 
four medicine inspectors. Another regulator told us that, 
in Mwanza City alone, there were more than 80 licenced 
pharmacies, 500 ADDOs and 1000 dispensaries. With 
minimal staff, it was impossible to cover all of these, let 
alone moving outside of the city, tracking down informal 
sellers or patrolling the vast lake shore.
Human resource constraints are further compounded 
by poor transport infrastructure and a lack of vehicles, 
making travel to more remote locations costly and time- 
consuming. By their own admission, regulators tended 
to focus their efforts on easily reached locations—a 
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put it, ‘They [inspectors] don’t go into the interior. In 
rural areas, the people haven’t even heard of [regulatory 
agency]’. In other situations, serious deficiencies in regu-
latory capacity have been shown to lead to poor enforce-
ment and can create systems vulnerable to corruption 
and bias; for example, in cases where businesses ‘facil-
itate’ inspectors’ visits by covering travel expenses and 
providing accommodation.29 30
A second key constraint was a lack of reliable informa-
tion and expertise required to distinguish a poor- quality 
medicine from a good one. In rural areas, inspections are 
often carried out by Trade Officers, with no pharmaco-
logical training or qualifications, whose work is limited to 
checking paperwork and conducting basic visual inspec-
tions. As one commented:
Understanding medicines needs a professional. I’m a pro-
fessional in business, not medicine. I may fail to detect that 
this medicine has expired or is not the proper one. I may 
get the feeling that something is wrong, but I can’t pin it 
on anything because I don’t know enough. The only thing 
I have to go on is the license. (Regional Trade Officer)
In reality, it is almost impossible even for a well- 
qualified pharmacist to detect a carefully manufactured 
and professionally packaged fake. While the WHO have 
invested in bolstering capacity in chemical analysis, the 
vast majority of inspectors have no access to even the 
most basic laboratory equipment. Developments in low- 
cost technologies like the WHO- endorsed Global Pharma 
Health Fund Minilab have potential to bridge this impor-
tant information gap. However, to date, they are still not 
widely available to regional/local authorities in Tanzania 
and elsewhere. Moreover, the sensitivity and reliability of 
low- cost technologies for detecting SF medicines have 
been questioned,31 while higher- specificity techniques 
like high- performance liquid chromatography remain 
prohibitively expensive in most LMIC settings. Instead, 
regulators rely on visual inspection and ‘hunches’.
Pharmacovigilance also depends on patients, phar-
macists and healthcare professionals reporting ‘adverse 
events’, including medicines not having the expected 
therapeutic effect. However, a combination of low diag-
nostic capacity, widespread polypharmacy and the possi-
bility of multiple comorbidities make it almost impossible 
to ascertain the precise therapeutic effects of a particular 
medicine or likely causes of treatment failure (eg, poor 
medicine quality vs incorrect diagnosis). As one inter-
viewee explained:
The main problem is polypharmacy: people taking mul-
tiple medicines so they cannot tell what has cured them. 
There are just too many uncontrolled drugs in circulation. 
[…] People are treating diseases that are not there. They 
are consuming a lot of medicine unnecessarily because of 
poor regulatory mechanisms. (District Medical Officer)
Third, even with adequate information and resourcing, 
there may be strong economic disincentives to reporting 
suspect products. Retailers may not voice suspicions 
about products because of the reputational damage and 
consequent loss of business that may follow. As we have 
reported elsewhere,32 33 in these contexts of fierce compe-
tition, risking a hard- won reputation for selling trusted 
medicines by reporting cases of apparently poor efficacy 
rarely makes business sense. Furthermore, according to 
our interviewees, when suspicions are reported, shop- 
owners have to pay 25% of product recall costs. For small- 
scale businesses, this represents a serious immediate 
financial risk on top of possible longer- term reputational 
damage.
Finally, reporting can carry risks to personal safety. 
Several regulators received information (tip- offs) from 
so- called ‘well- wishers’, ranging from health- workers, to 
informants with information on criminal organisations, 
to unhappy consumers. Reporting to protect others from 
harm, thereby serving the public interest, is a form of 
‘whistle- blowing’. However, even in high- income coun-
tries, we know there are many serious disincentives to 
whistle- blowers, who often face retribution and ostra-
cism.34 35 Our interviews confirmed that reporting SF 
medicines can incur considerable costs for informants, 
who may also be required to assist in further investiga-
tions, increasing their risks of exposure. As one local 
regulator put it, ‘These tip- offs are anonymous because 
these business- people have money and are powerful; the 
well- wishers don’t want to be identified’.
Indeed, information in Tanzania is more often shared 
in the opposite direction, with knowledge of the arrival 
of inspectors spreading quickly throughout a community. 
Another local regulator explained:
There are general stores that sell a few medicines. They are 
not allowed at all to do this … but once you reach the vil-
lage information goes quickly so everyone will either hide 
the medicines or close the shop, so you won’t realise.
Investigating allegations and sanctioning misconduct
The next stage for a regulator is investigation and, where 
appropriate, sanctioning those involved in misconduct. 
Investigating allegations often entails inter- agency collab-
oration, and interviewees reported many examples of 
regulators working together to tackle a problem, some-
times involving police and other enforcement agencies. 
However, inter- agency working is not always straightfor-
ward: operational disagreements about the focus and 
execution of investigations, along with the ever- present 
risk that information will be leaked ahead of time about 
an imminent inspection, was often said to hinder the 
progression of cases.
Like whistleblowing, investigating allegations of irreg-
ular or illegal practice can carry personal risks for regula-
tors. One local regulator recalled violent confrontations 
resulting from ‘under- cover work’, giving the example 
of a counterfeit labelling operation he had been inves-
tigating and noting that routine inspections could start 
peacefully but end violently. Another local regulator said 
bluntly, ‘If you are not friendly to them [shopkeepers], 
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on their own, or in very small teams, these concerns may 
make regulators more cautious about investigating non- 
compliance and enforcing regulations.
Ethical dilemmas can arise when carrying out inspec-
tions on the ground. In rural areas, where medicine 
outlets are scarce, there may be serious implications of 
closing down the only ADDO serving a large population: 
‘People need medicine. If you close the shop, it is not just 
the owner who will suffer, the whole village will suffer’. 
This regional regulator told us that, in such cases, they 
may decide to work with retailers to help them comply 
with regulations rather than acting punitively and cutting 
off access to essential medicines for a whole community: 
‘So, you don’t close the shop; you counsel the man that 
he has to pay and follow the government regulations’. 
However, this is not always straightforward:
On the first day you counsel him then you have to become 
as if furious and close the door. He will tell the reality—I 
don’t have money I will pay [the licensing fee] later but 
the next day he doesn’t come and he doesn’t come the day 
after that so after two weeks you go back again but if he 
doesn’t pay that doesn’t mean you close the shop.
Deterring misconduct and improving regulatory function
The final stage in our accountability chain is based on 
optimal deterrence theory and postulates that individ-
uals will desist from engaging in misconduct—such as 
failing to comply with regulations or knowingly supplying 
substandard medicines—if they assess that risks of being 
caught and punished outweigh the benefits.36 Thus, 
for the GSMS to lead to effective deterrence, it must be 
perceived to have increased the risks and penalties asso-
ciated with trading and selling SF medicines.
There is little current evidence that regulators are 
perceived as tough enforcers; the vast majority of infringe-
ments appear to go unpunished. Most interviewees strug-
gled to recollect any cases of successful prosecutions. One 
Mwanza regulator could recall only one case, in 2012, 
involving a local manufacturer; however, after 4 years, the 
case was still in the courts. Another cited a single instance 
of a pharmacy being closed down (for stocking US$45 
000 worth of unregistered drugs). Even successful pros-
ecutions reportedly resulted in weak penalties. A local 
regulator complained that the maximum penalties were 
a fine of 5 million TZS (approximately 1750 GBP) or 3 
years imprisonment but ‘because there is no minimum 
penalty, they can usually get away with a lot less’. In prac-
tice, within Mwanza at least, penalties apparently rarely 
exceeded closing a shop down for a few weeks.
Other interviewees spoke only in very general terms 
about enforcement and penalties, implying that current 
reporting mechanisms were failing to deter those 
violating regulations. ‘In Tanzania we have very good 
policy—the issue is implementation’, said one local regu-
lator, reflecting a commonly held view. Another told us, 
‘There are laws, but enforcement is weak. Small shops 
will sell you two capsules of amoxicillin. There are laws 
that prohibit this, but it happens’.
Some interviewees spoke about the possibility of corrup-
tion. One national- level regulator suggested ‘some of 
them [inspectors] might be more interested in collecting 
fees [bribes] than in controlling the goods’, while 
another claimed police officers might be ‘persuaded’ 
to modify documents before a case came to court. One 
local industry representative pointed to a more systemic 
problem of political interference and weak rule of law:
It depends on the head of state and the ministers. The 
problem is corruption. So, if the TFDA inspectors find a 
problem and sue you, people go through the politicians. 
Politicians put pressure on law enforcers to drop the case 
because they are party supporters and the politicians need 
their votes. Politicians should enforce the laws regardless 
of their party.
Overall, the evidence presented here suggests it is 
unlikely that the current monitoring and reporting 
regime is having any significant deterrent effect.
DISCUSSION
There is a growing body of research and policy direc-
tives on the importance of reporting SF medicines. This 
builds on theory and empirical evidence suggesting that 
transparency and reporting can enhance accountability 
and improve provision of public and private goods and 
services. However, much empirical evidence about this 
relationship is based on studying the effects of intro-
ducing transparency in high- income contexts; even in 
these contexts evidence suggests that a strong account-
ability ecosystem is necessary to achieve the best results.
The interview data presented earlier provide a glimpse 
into the lived experiences of regulators in Tanzania 
who work on the ground to enact policy edicts from 
the WHO, national government and others in a compli-
cated and often messy ‘real world’. Their experiences 
provide important insights into how theorised mecha-
nisms between reporting and a reduction in undesirable 
behaviours play out in a low- income context, helping to 
identify many hidden assumptions about the behaviour 
of regulators vis- a- vis commercial actors and consumers 
of medicine.
First, we find that regulators often lack resources to 
fulfil their roles properly, particularly given the need to 
travel long distances in a country with poor infrastruc-
ture. This lack of capacity could, in theory, be compen-
sated by a healthy reporting system, if other stakeholders 
with an interest in improving accountability reported 
suspicions. However, this mechanism is also inhibited. 
In a context of inadequate diagnostic tools, comorbidi-
ties and practices of polypharmacy, patients, healthcare 
workers and retailers all find it difficult to judge a medi-
cine’s effectiveness. They also face very real economic 
and social barriers to reporting, with retailers fearing 
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whistle- blowers may not want to harm someone’s business 
and may also expect retribution.
Second, we find that regulators’ ability and willingness 
to investigate and sanction allegations is inhibited by 
difficulties in cooperating with other agencies in order 
to collect evidence. This could potentially be solved by 
more clearly specifying strategies and allocating respon-
sibilities. But there are also more pragmatic hindrances 
and ethical quandaries. Regulators must manage rela-
tionships with retailers over many years, and hence seek 
to balance tough enforcement against the need to elicit 
compliance. In rural areas, tough enforcement against a 
non- compliant retailer might lead to an area’s only medi-
cines outlet closing down, with serious health implica-
tions for the wider community.
Third, it seems unlikely that the current regulatory 
system has much effect in deterring misconduct or non- 
compliance. Our evidence suggests regulatory violations 
are often ignored and, even if exposed, are unlikely to be 
sanctioned. However, our findings also cast doubt on the 
extent to which we should characterise weak regulation 
of SF medicines as a problem of ‘misconduct’. Certainly, 
for regulators, there are a number of reasons to under-
stand gaps in identifying, reporting, investigating and 
enforcing compliance more as inevitable consequences 
of weak capacity and difficult operating conditions.
CONCLUSION
In summary, this study has shown that SF medicines are 
a particularly complex policy area in which to roll out 
a global monitoring and reporting mechanism such as 
the GSMS, raising serious questions about their poten-
tial effectiveness without very substantial investment in 
capacity of local regulatory authorities. We should reit-
erate that these problems are not unique to Tanzania; 
indeed (as noted earlier), Tanzania’s regulatory authori-
ties are widely regarded to be among the best- functioning 
in sub- Saharan Africa. The challenges we have described 
here are likely to be the tip of the iceberg in the context 
of the African region as a whole.
This study has certain limitations. It is based on inter-
views with regulators and regulatees and relies on their 
own understandings of the problem and what they were 
willing to share with the research team. In such a sensitive 
area, and in a context where government was becoming 
increasingly tough on misconduct and corruption, it is 
possible that our research under- estimates the role of 
deliberate subversion of regulatory processes. However, 
in a context of low regulatory capacity, it is also difficult 
to distinguish the more or less innocuous causes of imple-
mentation gaps.
The study is also cross- sectional, making it difficult to 
disentangle causal effects, particularly when dealing with 
supply chains of medicines that may be long, complex 
and opaque, with no single actor having oversight of the 
whole. Future research could seek to understand how 
complex relationships between regulators, commercial 
actors, health- workers and consumers of medicines 
unfold over time as regulatory and reporting regimes 
change.
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